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In order to make any dent on unemployment, South Africa's growth path
needs to become significantly more labour-demanding. But what is the best
way of achieving that end? On the face of it, the problem is simple: job
creation depends crucially on investment growth, hence appropriate
strategies are those which encourage capital accumulation and ensure that
as many jobs as possible are created per unit of investment. But this
apparently focussed answer raises two further fundamental questions:
what drives investment; and what kind of investment is best suited to
sustainable, labour-demanding growth?
The first part of the paper considers some of the macroeconomic
determinants of investment, and asks whether South Africa's
macroeconomic growth strategy is ' investor-friendly'. Although the jury is
still out, it seems that the architects of the government's Growth,
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework underestimated the
negative impact of constraining demand on private investment. But the
determinants of growth extend beyond the macroeconomic policy stance
and into the arena of the growth path itself. Part Two considers the question
of what broader growth strategies are good for growth. In doing so, it
considers some of the 'lessons' from international experience for growth.
The South African experience is referred to where relevant.
Part Three considers the narrower question as to what kind of investment
is appropriate for a labour-demanding growth path. Is it better to go for
maximising the number of jobs created now - in which case labour-
intensive investment is preferable - or is there an argument in favour of
capital- and skill-intensive investment as a catalyst for more dynamic and
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labour-demanding growth later? 'High productivity now' (HPN) strategies
(which appear to inform South Africa's industrial and labour policies) opt
for the latter. 'Hard HPN' strategies seek to discourage (or even eliminate)
low-wage, low-productivity activities, whereas 'Soft HPN' strategies seek
merely to encourage greater productivity growth. It is argued that South
Africa's industrial policy stance is consistent with Soft HPN, but that
labour market policy towards wage-setting is more in line with Hard HPN
thinking.
Investment and the macroeconomic environment
The question as to what drives investment is one of the most vexed in
economics. Answers range from Keynes' s 'animal spirits', to more specific
determinants such as savings, the interest rate, and current and expected
profit rates etc. Given that the search for pro fit underpins private investment,
all of the above probably have a role to play: higher expected returns attract
higher investment; and the lower the cost of borrowing (and higher the
level of savings), the greater the range of profitable investment projects.
But these variables only capture part of the picture. The range of profitable
investment projects is also a function of the available infrastructure, the
existence of support services and the supply of available inputs, market
size etc. In other words, less easy-to-measure factors such as the level and
pattern of development, and the nature of government support, are also
important.
In his review of empirical literature on the determinants of investment,
Chirinko found that the most significant determinant was (lagged) demand:
investment rose when economic growth was strong, and fell when it
weakened (1993:1883). This suggests that investors feel more confident
about future streams of income when expenditure is rising, and hence are
more prepared to make investments. But there is a clear limit on this
relationship: if the rise in demand is so strong that it undermines
macroeconomic balance (ie results in inflation and a depreciation of the
exchange rate) then profitability may be threatened. The history of
macroeconomic populism in Latin America shows very clearly that
destabilising increases in demand undermine rather than induce investment.
The message is thus that a stable, but growing, economy is probably the
most suited to attracting high and sustained levels of investment.
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In this regard, one of the lessons of the Asian growth path is that
inflationary financing of budget deficits should be avoided. The eight
highly performing Asian economies (HPAEs), namely Japan, Hong Kong,
South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, chose
either to keep budget deficits small (eg South Korea), or in the case of
Malaysia and Thailand (which ran large deficits), took advantage of high
domestic savings and the rapid increase in demand for financial assets
which accompanied growth (Page 1997:25). As a result, inflation was
lower, and real interest rates far more stable, than in Latin America. Such
an environment was ultimately more conducive to investment (Birdsall and
Jaspersen 1997).
Differences in savings may be one of the reasons for cross-country
differences in investment. Whereas the HPAEs were able to mobilise a
huge pool of domestic savings to finance investment, the Latin American
countries (and South Africa) were characterised by relatively low rates of
saving and investment (Jaspersen 1997). However, as savings and investment
tend to follow growth (Gavin et al 1997), these savings and investment
rates are probably more a result, than a cause, of differences in growth
performance. One of the benefits, however, of a large pool of domestic
savings was that the HPAEs were able to avoid the serious debt crises which
beset most of Latin America, were less prone to destabilising capital flight,
and were better able to weather the external shocks of the early 1980s.
Is South Africa's maCroeconomic policy stance conducive to investment?
Yes and no. The GEAR strategy of reducing the fiscal deficit (and avoiding
any inflationary financing thereof) ought to support investment in the sense
that greater stability is being injected into the macroeconomic environment.
But to the extent that this restrictive fiscal stance withdraws demand from
the economy, investment demand is dampened accordingly. Thus, depending
on which effect one imagines is more important, one can conclude that
GEAR is either good or bad for investment.
In deriving their predictions for future trends, the architects of GEAR
(RSA 1996) assumed that investors would respond quickly and well to the
lower deficit (and to the government's commitment to continued deficit
reduction). The assumption was that the positive impact of increased
investor confidence on investment would outweigh the negative impact of
tighter fiscal policy on demand and investment (Nattrass 1996).
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Has it worked? On the 'positive' side, the fiscal deficit target was
reached, and inflation fell to lower levels than predicted. However, the
drop in the deficit was not accompanied by lower interest rates - indeed, the
real bank rate rose sharply - and private investment has remained sluggish.
As can be seen in Table 1, South Africa's investment, output and employment
growth was way below target during the 1990s. This is consistent with the
warnings of economists across the ideological spectrum that GEAR would
reduce demand, and that private investment would follow demand
downwards, rather than compensating for it.1 It is also consistent with
evidence that aggressively anti-inflationary components of stabilisation
packages have undermined, rather than supported, growth (Stiglitz 1998:
7-9). The GEAR modellers were almost certainly unrealistic in their
assumption that business confidence would rise (drawing investment up
with it) once the GEAR policies had been announced to the business
community.
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But not all of South Africa's poor growth performance can be laid at the
door of GEAR. From early 1998, the economy suffered from the contagion
effects of the Asian crisis that affected growth in ways that could not
reasonably have been predicted. However, even as early as 1996 and 1997,
differences emerged between the GEAR projections and actual economic
trends. Furthermore, it appears that South Africa's growth performance
was significantly worse than that of other middle-income countries, and
worse than that which would have been predicted solely on the basis of
changing world market conditions (Weeks 1999:804-8). This implies that
the GEAR strategy exercised a major, and independently negative, impact
on growth and investment.
Another reason why the GEAR targets were not met may have been
because the GEAR strategy was not implemented consistently, particularly
with regard to labour-market policy. In contrast to the labour-market vision
outlined in GEAR, the government passed various pieces of legislation that
increased the costs of employing labour2 and extended minimum wage
floors. Promised reforms to existing labour laws - such as amendments to
the mandatory extension of collectively bargained agreements to non-
parties - did not materialise.3
According to evidence from the OECD (1999:156-9), countries that
have undergone macroeconomic stabilisation without addressing labour
market rigidity have found the experience costly in terms of unemployment.
South Africa is unlikely to be an exception. As can be seen in Table 1,
instead of generating jobs, GEAR has presided over significant job losses
in the formal (non-agricultural) sector. Although much of the decrease in
employment (eg in mining) cannot be blamed, directly on GEAR, it is
nevertheless feasible that co-ordination failures between fiscal, monetary
and labour-market policy could be exacerbating unemployment (Nattrass
1998). And, even with regard to short-term poverty-relief employment
programmes, the government appears not to be able to deliver on the jobs
front. Although great plans were trumpeted about short-term job creation
for the unemployed in public works programmes and the like (eg RSA
1998), the government (with the exception of the Department of Water
Affairs) has had little success in deploying what little funds were actually
allocated for such purposes.4
Note that there is some evidence of a marginal increase in employment
in the iate 1990s, but this has not been enough to reverse the general
downward trend of the decade. According to figures from the October
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Household Survey, total employment rose slightly between 1996 and 1998,
but unemployment increased as the labour force grew even faster. According
to these official statistics (which are questionable, particularly with regard
to agriculture (see Simbi and Aliber 2000), total employment increased in
these years because employment in agriculture and domestic services
supposedly grew sufficiently to compensate for the decline in employment
elsewhere. Even if employment did increase in this way, it is nevertheless
worrying because informal employment tends to be of a survivalist nature,
and agricultural employment tends to be seasonal and vulnerable to
droughts and other disasters.
There is also evidence of increased casualisation of the labour force
(Kenny and Webster 1998), some of which is not picked up in official
statistics. However, sustained growth in living standards is best based on
a healthy growth in full-time formal employment - particularly in
manufacturing and services. Hence trends in non-agricultural formal
employment remain an important economic growth indicator.
The macroeconomic policy stance is only one aspect of the growth path.
Given that growth itself drives investment, it is thus necessary to consider
the broader question of the growth path in order to gain a fuller picture of
what drives investment.
The determinants of growth: lessons from international experience?
The international literature on economic growth is vast and varied. If there
is a broad consensus on the 'lessons' of successful economic growth it is
probably this: an export orientation and an educated labour force are good
for growth. The relative importance of state versus the market in development
remains a subject of great debate.
• Export orientation and growth
Perhaps the most oft-cited 'lesson' from international experience is that
producing for the export market is good for growth. The HPAEs were able
to expand output and employment dramatically (particularly in the
manufacturing sector) through producing for the rapidly expanding external
market.5 Between 1965 and 1990, per capita GDP averaged 5.6 per cent pa
in the HPAEs, whereas per capita incomes grew by a mere 1.2 per cent pa
in the major (inwardly-oriented) Latin American economies over the same
period (Birdsall and Jaspersen 1997). South Africa followed the Latin
American route, becoming one of the first developing countries to opt for
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inward industrialisation (McCarthy 1998:66). And, having out-performed
most similar developing countries during the first part of the twentieth
century, the South African economy, like its Latin American counterparts,
ran out of steam in the 1970s and 1980s. Whereas other countries benefited
tremendously from the ideal external economic conditions of 1950-73,
South Africa's 'post-war leap' was the 'lowest on record' (Moll 1993:5).
This 'lesson' needs qualification in at least three important respects.
Firstly, export-led growth has not been synonymous with trade liberalisation
(as often assumed by proponents of neo-liberal economic reforms).
Governments of the HPAEs provided a high level of temporary effective
protection to firms and sectors conditional on their successful export
performance. Secondly, an export orientation is only good for growth when
external markets are expanding fast. The experience of Latin American
countries that embarked on significant economic liberalisation in the 1980s
and 1990s is instructive in this regard. Whereas the northern Latin American
countries (which export mainly to the United States) experienced strong
export growth in the mid- to late-1990s, this was not the case in the rest of
the region. Panama, and all countries to the South, experienced a decline
in exports in the mid-1990s because of the recession in their major export
market (Asia and Europe). Morley describes the phenomenon as 'export-
led decline' (2000:26-27).
Thirdly, it is important to realise that successful export-led growth
depends on controlling costs, and keeping wage growth in line with
productivity. In the 1960s and 1970s, the HPAEs dominated the low-wage,
labour-intensive end of international trade. As manufacturing exports
expanded rapidly, labour was increasingly drawn out of lower value-added
sectors and into manufacturing. Over time, the manufacturing sector itself
started moving into higher value-added product lines - a process aided by
targeted industrial policies (Weiss 1998) and the fact that most workers had
a basic education (Wood 1994). Wage flexibility appears to have kept
unemployment low and steady, and a more rapid rise in productivity than
wages (up until at least the mid-1980s) helped fuel investment and growth
(World Bank 1993). Strong growth in output and employment ensured that
wages and living standards rose.
Unfortunately, by the time that South Africa and Latin America started
liberalising their trade regimes, low-wage countries like Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Pakistan and China had moved into the lower value-added end
of the international market. This meant that those middle-income countries
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with developed industrial structures and intermediate ratios of skilled to
unskilled labour, experienced a fall in demand for unskilled labour as
competition from low-wage economies increased at the lower end of the
value-chain (Wood 1997, OECD 1997, Dirwan and Walton 1997).6
In Latin America, the result has been falling demand for unskilled labour
and an increasingly skill-intensive growth and inegalitarian growth path
(Stallings 2000, Morley 2000). Similar trends are evident in South Africa.
Manufacturing exports have grown, but mostly in capital- and skill-
intensive product lines (Bell and Cattaneo 1997:6-7, ILO 1999:14-16,
Edwards 2000), and increased import penetration has had a significantly
negative effect on employment in ultra-labour-intensive sectors.7 There is
evidence that South Africa is moving towards more (intermediate) skill-
intensive product lines, with technological change in manufacturing
resulting in an increased demand for skilled labour (Standing 1997). The
demand for skilled workers (particularly in the information technology
sector) has been rising, and the general shift towards capital intensity has
further increased the demand for skilled workers, and reduced the demand
for unskilled workers (Bhorat and Hodge 1999). This suggests that rising
wage inequality and persistent unemployment will characterise the South
African growth path for some time.
• State versus market
There is general agreement that competition is necessary for sustained
growth. However, the exact role that the state should play in the development
process remains the subject of much debate. Except for Hong Kong (and to
a lesser extent Singapore), the state played a highly interventionist role in
the HPAEs with regard to the direction of investment and industrial policy.
The developmental states of East Asia mobilised resources (in Korea's case
by nationalising the financial sector), acted entrepreneurially where
necessary (in Taiwan's case through state-owned enterprises) and otherwise
coerced and disciplined capital (see, for example, White 1988). Indeed, the
coexistence of rapid economic growth, selective protection and targeted
support of key industries in South Korea, Japan and Taiwan lead some
analysts to conclude that industrial policies were central to the growth of
total factor productivity and technological catch-up (eg Amsden 1989,
Wade 1990, Weiss 1998).
A corollary of this argument is that efficient bureaucracies and
performance-related support measures enabled East Asian industrial policies
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to avoid the pitfalls of rent-seeking, corruption etc, that characterised Latin
American support of industry with tariff barriers. Any policy of strategic
intervention is risky in the sense that state officials have to make educated
guesses about which industries or firms will turn out to be winners. Tying
support to clear performance criteria - most notably measurable trends
such as export performance - and being willing to drop support in cases of
clear failure - helps limit the potential for wasting resources. According to
Evans (1995), the success of interventionist states like Japan lay in the fact
that they were both 'embedded', in the sense that information flowed easily
and well between bureaucrats and firms, and 'autonomous', in that they
were able to withstand pressure from firms to maintain support where it was
not efficient to do so. This helped facilitate the development of specific
state capacities geared around industrial policy (Weiss 1998).
Other analyses (eg World Bank 1993, Page 1997), however, play down
the role of strategic intervention and attribute the success of the HPAEs to
the business environment common to all of them, ie stable macroeconomic
policies, stable and competitive exchange rates and high savings rates.
Page, for example, points out that productivity growth in Korea and Taiwan
was high by international standards, but not higher in sectors targeted for
special attention by such industrial policies (1997:46-47). He thus concludes
that export orientation — rather than industrial policy - was the main reason
behind productivity growth (1997:48). However, aggregate industrial
statistics can easily hide the impact of industrial policy targeted at firm
(rather than industry) level; so, to an important extent, this debate remains
moot.
The debate over state intervention and market signals recently resurfaced
again as a result of the 1998 Asian crisis that started in Thailand and
reverberated across the globe. The IMF adjustment packages for Thailand,
South Korea and Japan (which placed strong emphasis on liberalisation
and deregulation) implicitly blamed government intervention in large part
for the crisis. Others, however, attributed the crisis to the financial
deregulation that occurred in East Asia during the 1990s, and predict that
IMF policies are pushing Asian economies in precisely the wrong direction
(see, for example, Chang 1998, Stiglitz 1998, Jomo 2000). The debate
about the role of state and market in East Asia is clearly far from over.
The history of government intervention in industry in South Africa is not
an edifying one. Although massive government investments in electricity
(ESCOM) and steel (ISCOR) arguably helped create a basis for the
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expansion of the manufacturing sector, the focus on mega projects and
armaments production tended to inject a strong bias towards capital-
intensity in industry (Kaplinsky 1995). So too did restrictions on the
employment of African labour in metropolitan areas, subsidies to producers,
accelerated depreciation allowances, negative real interest rates and racial
discrimination in skills acquisition.
In addition, the state wasted vast sums of money in attracting industry
to the 'border' areas of homelands and to low-wage 'decentralised' areas
(Haines 1996). Incentives of 100 per cent of the wage bill were offered
along with transport and rent subsidies. While labour-intensive forms of
production were indeed attracted to poor areas, many of the industries
(particularly in clothing) were decentralising anyway because of wage
pressure in metropolitan areas (Bell 1997). Many of these firms stayed on
after the withdrawal of incentives (Sharp and Spiegel 1996) and are now
being threatened by the minimum wage determinations - from which they
had previously been exempt (Nattrass 2000a).
During the 1990s, the decentralisation strategy was restructured and
simplified and now consists of a tax holiday scheme, spatial development
initiatives and industrial development zones (DTI 1998:23-36). The idea is
to create industrial clusters in key areas in order to promote agglomeration
economies, co-operative relations between firms, and backward and forward
linkages. It is too early to tell if this approach will in fact deliver dynamic,
labour-demanding growth. So far, the investment costs have been very
high in relation to the number of jobs created. The spatial development
initiative (which the DTI regards as 'one of its most successful programmes'
has so far created 10,000 jobs at an investment cost of R17 billion and a
further 400 programmes are in the pipeline promising to create 6800 jobs
at a cost of R83 billion (DTI 1998:28). At between R1.2 million and R1.7
million a job, this is a very capital intensive outcome! Industrial policy
likewise nods in the direction of supporting labour-intensive sectors, but in
practice has failed to do so. Even the tax holiday scheme, which was aimed
in part at encouraging labour-intensive manufacturing, has succeeded only
in creating jobs at a cost of R237.000 each (DTI 1998:26). The record
relating to the Industrial Development Zones is similarly uninspiring.
Rather than initiate large-scale job creation, the DTI has succeeded mainly
in attracting large capital-intensive mega projects (1LO 1999:25) - which
is not surprising given that existing labour regulations and standards are
enforced in these areas.
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• Education, growth and inequality
As emphasised by the new 'endogenous growth' theory, higher levels of
accumulation of both physical and human capital are vital contributing
factors to per capita income growth as it is the interaction between ideas
and accumulation which results in increasing returns to scale of physical
and human capital. This literature suggests that if human to physical capital
ratios are initially high, then a country's subsequent economic performance
will be characterised by faster investment and per capita income growth.
Empirical work by Barro (1991) - which shows that for a given quantity of
initial human capital, a poor country tends to grow faster than a rich
country, so that incomes converge over the period among countries with
similar levels of education - supports this hypothesis. This is suggestive of
the costs, in terms of the waste of human potential and lost growth, of
apartheid education and training policies on South African development.
It also supports the emphasis that South Africa is placing on improving
education and skills development.
An increase in the supply of educated labour is only beneficial for
growth if it is matched by a similar increase in demand - as occurred in the
HPAEs (Birdsall et al 1997:103-4). Increasing education on its own, is not
a sufficient condition for growth, and rapid growth is required to finance
education and to boost the creation of both skilled and relatively unskilled
jobs. The provision of health and educational services is a necessary
condition for the creation of a 'virtuous cycle' between human development
and growth (Ramirez et al 1997). But it is not a sufficient condition.
Note also that when growth is particularly demanding of workers with
a basic education relative to those with more skills, then wage inequality
will fall - thus contributing towards an egalitarian growth path. This was
the case in the HPAEs during the early growth phase. However, where
growth is skill-intensive - and particularly when skilled labour is in short
supply - then wage inequality is likely to widen. This outcome was typical
in countries pursuing ISI strategies, including Latin America and South
Africa. Latin America has subsequently shifted away from ISI and inequality
has widened further- largely as a result of increased inequality within the
skilled section of the workforce (Morley 2000).
In South Africa's case, two forces appear to be acting on the wage
distribution. On the one hand, the demand for skilled labour is putting
upward pressure on the top end of the wage distribution. On the other hand,
trade union pressure appears to be favouring lower paid workers (Schultz
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and Mbawu 1998), thus contributing to a narrowing of wage inequality. But
wage inequality is not the only factor driving inequality in South Africa.
The gap between employed and unemployed households is also a significant
driving factor (Leibbrandt et al 2000, Seekings 2000). To the extent that
higher unskilled wages restrains job creation, a narrower wage distribution
may be associated with higher overall inequality.
In general, improving the productivity of the poor through education
and training should help reduce inequality, as it allows them to participate
more fruitfully in the economy and obtain a bigger share of the growth
dividend. However, this must be matched by an increase in income-earning
opportunities -particularly jobs - if inequality is to fall. Where large pools
of surplus-labour exist, creating jobs (even low-wage, low-productivity
jobs) is almost certainly a necessary first step. In South Africa's case,
where unemployment is a major determinant of inequality, job creation for
the unskilled is a necessary condition for any significant and sustained
reduction in inequality. This means that either capital accumulation has to
be so rapid that employment and incomes rise along with an increase in
capital intensity, orthatmore labour-intensive sectors expand significantly
alongside higher productivity activities.
Dilemmas of the High Productivity Now (HPN) growth path
This brings us to the question of a potential trade-off between short-term
job creation, and laying the basis for sustainable growth and higher future
job creation. Is it better to go for maximising the number of jobs created
now - in which case labour-intensive investment is preferable - or is there
an argument in favour of capital- and skill-intensive investment as a
catalyst for more dynamic and labour-demanding growth later?
In the case of the HPAEs, there was no tension between these objectives
because the growth path was labour-demanding, although not, in the main,
labour-intensive (Birdsall 1997:101-2, Jaspersen 1997:75-82). To be sure,
workers were initially drawn into labour-intensive sectors and activities,
but as economic growth gathered pace, the production structure shifted
steadily towards higher productivity activities. Labour productivity rose,
but so did employment because of the even faster (export-driven) increase
in output (Galenson 1992).
There appears to be little chance of replicating this growth path. Firstly,
the international conditions facing South Africa are very different to those
enjoyed by the HPAEs in the post-war boom. Secondly, the South African
growth strategy is not premised on the notion that labour should first be
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drawn into low-wage, low-productivity activities, and then only
subsequently be drawn up the value chain. Indeed, the very opposite notion
appears to be driving labour and industrial policies, namely, that high
value-added, high (labour) productivity8 - and hence high-wage - activities
should be promoted wow in order to transform South African manufacturing
into a dynamic and competitive lead sector.
On one level, it seems absurd given South Africa's massive labour
surplus, to be engaging in any form of increase in labour productivity.
Indeed, in a relatively capital-scarce and labour-abundant economy, there
is a strong argument to be made that it is capital productivity that should be
maximised, even if this implies falling labour productivity.9 However the
implication of a low wage labour path is unpalatable to organised labour,
and to proponents of HPN who populate the corridors of the Ministry of
Labour and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
This 'high productivity now' (HPN) strategy assumes that even in a
labour surplus middle-income economy like South Africa, it is necessary
to increase productivity today in order to project the economy onto a more
dynamic (and ultimately more labour-demanding) growth path tomorrow.
It belongs in the class of growth strategies which assume that competitiveness
rests primarily (if not solely) on the adoption of cutting-edge technologies,
on nurturing firms and segments of the economy that demonstrate
competitive advantage,10 and otherwise generally encouraging structural
change in favour of higher value-added activities..Proponents of such
views point to the success of government industrial policies in the HPAEs,
and locate themselves within the theoretical ambit of endogenous growth
theory, highlighting the dynamic benefits of human capital, learning-by-
doing, the spill-over effects of technology etc. South Africa's Industrial
Strategy Project (ISP) is an example of this genre (Joffe et al 1995), and
much of this thinking is evident in DTI documents (DTI 1995, 1998).
The message is attractive: invest in people, technology, infrastructure,
work-place re-organisation, inter-firm co-operation etc, and achieve the
win-win scenario of greater competitiveness, a better-paid workforce, and
faster, sustainable growth. But behind the lure and glamour lurks the cost:
significant employment creation is relegated to second- or third-round
effects. HPN is, in other words, a reincarnation of the old 'trickle-down'
story: increases in productivity drive the rising tide of growth; the
unemployed must go to night school and training programmes whilst
waiting for the employment waters to rise.
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HPN comes in 'soft' and 'hard' versions. The soft version argues that
active support should be given to higher productivity firms and sectors, and
productivity improvements should be sought wherever possible. Such a
strategy only harms low-wage, low-productivity activities in the sense that
resources are not channelled in their direction. DTI policies appear to be
supportive of this soft HPN position. Hard HPN, by contrast, not only
promotes high productivity through supportive measures, but engineers an
economy-wide shift in favour of higher productivity firms and sectors by
actively undermining (even destroying) low-wage, low-productivity sectors.
Using wage increases to force low-productivity activities out of business
would constitute part of a hard HPN strategy.
The ISP, for example, comments favourably on the German system of
wage determination which 'keeps wages higher, and differentials lower
than would be determined by a freely-functioning labour market' and thus
'encourages investment in training and retraining as a mechanism to
enhance productivity to match these wages'. A highly regulated labour
market, argues the ISP, will 'encourage restructuring up the value chain
rather than restructuring towards low-wage, low-productivity forms of
production' (Joffe et al 1995:213). The ISP situates COSATU's approach
to industrial restructuring within this particular logic, pointing out that it is
'premised on the need to move South African firms out of their low-wage,
low-skill, low-productivity vicious circle in which they are out-competed
by the second-tier Newly Industrialising countries' (1995:214).
The presentation of binary opposites - a low-wage, low-productivity
'vicious circle' versus a dynamic high-wage, high-productivity nirvana —.
is typical of hard HPN. The notion that one can have high-wage, high-
productivity firms and sectors alongside lower-wage, lower-productivity
activities is an anathema to hard HPN thinking. The ruling assumption
appears to be that low-wage, low-productivity firms will necessarily
undermine high-wage, high productivity activities. Talk of'vicious circles'
implies that there will be a race to the bottom of the value-chain unless a
policy of zero tolerance is adopted towards low-wage, low-productivity
activities. Using the wage to drive out low-wage, low-productivity sectors
is part of such a strategy.
• Using the wage to force restructuring up the value-chain (hard HFN)
Increasing the costs of employing labour can be a deliberate part of a high
productivity growth strategy (see for example Lee 1996:495). It was, for
example, an integral part of the philosophy behind the post-war
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'Scandinavian model'. Centralised wage bargaining set wages across all
firms, regardless of productivity performance, thus putting pressure on
low-productivity firms and sectors (Henley and Tsakalotos 1993). Workers
who lost their jobs as a result of such restructuring received generous
welfare benefits whilst being retrained for employment. The strategy
worked well in Sweden until it fell apart under the combined impact of
productivity slowdown, unemployment, and fiscal crisis (Lindbeck 1997).
The apartheid wage-setting machinery was used to similar effect in South
Africa, except with the more limited aim of providing full employment for
white workers (Nattrass and Seekings 1997). Once African workers were
incorporated into the wage-setting machinery in a context of rising
unemployment and inadequate labour market welfare provision, the system
manifestly became incapable of supporting full employment for any group,
and instead probably contributed to falling labour absorption.
As Moll has argued (1996), larger firms use more capital-intensive
techniques, achieve higher labour productivity, and hence pay higher
wages than smaller firms. Data from the South African Manufacturing
Survey supports this supposition: value added per worker rises with size of
firm, thus indicating that larger firms tend to manifest higher labour
productivity; and larger firms tend to be more capital-intensive and pay
higher wages." As bargaining councils are dominated by large firms -
where it is easier to organise workers12 - the bargained wage is more likely
to suit capital- rather than labour-intensive activities. Compulsory extensions
of collectively bargained agreements to non-parties thus probably harm
labour-intensive firms and activities, and hence reduce labour absorption
in manufacturing (see also Nattrass 2000b).
As noted earlier, the ministry of Labour has not yet acted to amend the
provision pertaining to compulsory extensions of collective bargains to
non-parties - this, despite various government policy documents and
statements in support of reform. Perhaps the ministry of Labour buys into
a hard HPN view of restructuring, and is thus resisting such changes. The
fact that the current minister of Labour was drawn from tiade union ranks
lends credibility to this speculation. And, despite calls for greater lenience
for small business with regard to minimum wages and labour standards,
very little concrete has been done. Exemptions to bargained agreements
remain largely in the hands of the parties to the agreement and wage
exemptions are rarely given (see review in Nattrass 2000b). All of this is
consistent with a hard HPN strategy which rests on the assumption that
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growth has to be based on increases in average productivity, and that this
has to be bought at any price - including the destruction of low-wage jobs.
A central problem with this position is that there is no necessary reason
why low-productivity, low-wage firms should out-compete high-wage,
high-productivity firms. Firstly, they are often producing different quality
products and hence are competing in different market niches. There is no
reason why a range of firms, using a range of technologies, cannot exist
side by side. Secondly, it is the ratio of wages to productivity that is
important to competitiveness - not the absolute level of the wage. As long
as high wages are justified by high productivity, there will be no 'race to
the bottom'.
A further difficulty arises with regard to the notion that economic
growth has to be based on rising average productivity. Rising labour
productivity can be achieved through the destruction of jobs (as has been
happening in South Africa) or it can be achieved through upgrading
technology, changing employment practices, shop-floor organisation etc.
Either way, rising average productivity implies that less labour is being
used per unit of output, and hence that the employment elasticity of output
is falling. An alternative strategy is one which tolerates the expansion of
low-wage, low-productivity jobs - even though this would slow down the
rate of growth of average productivity. Indeed, given South Africa's
unemployment crisis, it would be desirable to have a strategy which
encourages rising productivity in the high-wage, high-tech, skill-intensive
sectors, but which is characterised by falling average productivity as new
low-wage, low-productivity jobs are created for the unemployed at an even
faster rate.
• The distributional dilemma of HPN
The HPN strategy essentially asks the currently unemployed generation to
make a sacrifice for the sake of the employed and better skilled amongst
them, and for the next generation which will (supposedly) enjoy the fruits
of a more dynamic economy. In the case of soft HPN, the sacrifice being
asked of the less-skilled is time, and in the case of hard HPN it may be loss
of income (as low-productivity jobs are destroyed) and time.
One way of addressing this distributional dilemma would be if those
who gained from HPN (either soft or hard) - ie high-tech industry and the
better educated, skilled and currently employed workforce — were taxed
sufficiently to finance adequate welfare grants and training programs for
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the unemployed. This was the implicit 'social contract' behind the
Scandinavian model - but it only held together while growth was rapid and
unemployment relatively low. In a labour-surplus middle-income country
like South Africa, such a scenario seems highly unlikely. Although there is
talk about a 'basic income grant' the numbers being bandied about are tiny
(R100 a month), and it is questionable whether the political will exists to
pay the associated tax bill.13
Those favouring HPN strategies have to make an ethical judgement
about the costs involved. Not only do they have to be sure that a HPN
strategy will actually deliver more labour-demanding growth in the future,
but they have to be sure that the benefits to future generations are worth the
costs (most notably unemployment) borne by many in the present. As Sen
has pointed out, it is also worth considering that the cost of unemployment
reaches beyond welfare payments: "The penalties of unemployment include
not only income loss, but also far-reaching effects on self-confidence,
work motivation, basic competence, social integration, racial harmony,
gender justice and the appreciation and use of individual freedom and
responsibility' (1997:169).
Ultimately the decision as to which strategy is optimal depends on the
prevailing social ethics and on the level of development. For a middle-
income economy like South Africa with high unemployment and limited
fiscal resources for providing adequate welfare, opting for a hard HPN
strategy is fraught with danger. Firstly, it assumes that an aggressive high
productivity strategy will indeed deliver the promised growth benefits.
This is a leap of faith, because it depends on how well South Africa
achieves that goal relative to similar strategies in other middle-income
economies in East Asia and Latin America. Secondly, even if boosting
average productivity does generate growth, it will exclude too many poor
people for too long from the fruits of that growth.
Notes
1. See, for example, Gibson and van Seventer 1995, Nattrass 1996, NIEP 1996,
Standing et al 1996:33, NLC 1996, Samson 1997.
2. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act provided for longer annual and
family leave (thus increasing the indirect cost of employing labour) and
reduced hours of work (thus increasing hourly fixed costs). The over-time
premium was also increased, with the result that over-time labour is now paid




3. Both the ministry of Finance's GEAR strategy (RSA 1996) and the ministry of
Labour's Employment Strategy Framework (RSA 1998:44) recommend that
amendments be made to the extension of collectively bargained wage agreements
to non-parties. Soon after the Labour Market Commission (LMC 1996)
presented its report, the Minister of Labour announced that changes to the
mandatory extension provision were immanent - yet nothing came of it. The
State President made a similar announcement in early 2000, but this too
appears to have been empty.
4. South Africa's new democratic institutions have been plagued with capacity
problems which have undermined various development and poverty alleviation
initiatives (Nattrass and Seekings 1998). The Welfare Department and the
Department of Public Works appear to be particularly incapable of spending
money on job creation and poverty alleviation programmes (see 'Now public
works betrays the poor', in Sunday Independent June 11, 2000).
5. The export-led growth model applies more to Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand
(and Hong Kong and Singapore) than it does to Korea, Taiwan and Japan (Jomo
2000:4).
6. Although there is still controversy regarding how much of the decline in
demand can be placed at the door of international trade, there is widespread
agreement that trade with low wage countries is at least one contributing factor.
As Wood observes, 'the debate is now over the magnitude of the effects, with
their direction- adverse to unskilled workers -being largely agreed' (1997:33).
7. According to Edwards (2000:6), import penetration reduced employment by
9.1 per cent in ultra-labour intensive industries, and by 2.4 per cent overall
between 1993 and 1997. However, once the position impact of export expansion
on employment (in export and related industries) is taken into account, he
estimates that the net impact of international trade on employment was to raise
employment by one percent over the period (2000:13). Fedderke et al (2000)
also found that the net measurable impact of trade was to increase employment
rather than reduce it. These results are in line with most decomposition
analyses in the international literature which estimate the impact of international
trade on employment to be small relative to that of technology (see overview
in OECD 1997:112-119). However, one's choice of model and decomposition
technique profoundly influences the results. Furthermore, where firms undertake
'defensive innovation' in the face of increased international competition, it is
impossible to disentangle meaningfully the relative impacts of trade and
technology. A recent ILO report points to the joint impact of trade and
technology in South Africa by attributing employment losses to 'a process of
rationalisation or downsizing which might occur as a reaction to increased
international competition'(1999:21).
8. Labour productivity refers to the ratio of employment to total output. For
convenience, labour productivity is simply referred to as 'productivity'.
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9. This argument was made by Sam Bowles in the Labour Market Commission,
but to no effect.
10. Michael Porter's The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) is a popular
bible for this set of beliefs. Monitor, an international consultancy which
operates in a Porter-framework, has had a lot of influence on the formulation
of industrial policy thinking in South Africa (Haines 1996:14-16).
11. See the 1993 Manufacturing Survey (Report no 30-01-01 1993).
12. Survey evidence indicates that the average party firm is between two and four
times larger than non-party firms (Boccara and Moll 1997, Du Toit et al 1995).
In the largest national bargaining council (for iron, steel, engineering and
metallurgical industries), less than one third of the firms (employing 65 per
cent of the workers) set wages for the entire industry (Standing et al 1996:143).
13. According to estimates by Samson et al (2000), it would cost R52 billion to
provide every person in South Africa with a grant of Rl 00 a month. This comes
to about 21 per cent of total government spending - ie well over twice the
amount currently spent on welfare. They argue that R24 billion can be
reclaimed from higher earners through the income tax system through
adjustments to marginal tax rates and income thresholds. This leaves the net
cost of transfer at R28 billion to be financed through further increases in
taxation. Given that South Africa's top income earners are already highly
burdened, it is thus likely that significant and sustainable increases in tax
revenues could only come about through either adding to the income tax burden
of households in, especially, the seventh and eighth income deciles (ie the
labour movement's chief constituency) or increasing value-added tax. If the
burden falls mainly on value-added tax, then the redistributive impact of the
basic income grant will be reduced, as the poor will be paying for part of it
every time they spend it on goods and services. At present both the trade union
movement and the Democratic Party (representing most of the rich) profess
support for a basic income grant, but both seem to anticipate that their
constituencies will not shoulder the financial burden.
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